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1. Land reform and trust relations in government
1.1  Governance structures and the slow pace of land reform
The land question, as it is posed academically in South Africa, is at the cutting edge of the development debate.1 Should land held by poor peasants, often under some kind of communal tenure, be reorganised as private property 
and absorbed into the market economy? Should land reform 
therefore target emerging commercial farmers? Or do communal 
forms of tenure and the subsistence-oriented modes of multiple 
livelihoods in rural areas have their own development and change 
potentials that can be released with support from appropriate 
infrastructure, despite the often dire and increasing poverty in 
such communities? (May 2000). The first ‘modern’ option assumes 
a massive movement of excluded people to the urban areas.2 The 
second option, unconditional support to subsistence livelihoods on 
communally held lands, and increased integration into markets, can 
lead to development without such a massive movement. However, 
the second option can seem irrelevant from an economic point of 
view. The contribution of financial surplus to the modern economy 
from subsistence production is limited or negative. The income of 
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bricoleurs (persons engaged in and searching for use-value oriented, 
multiple livelihoods, Levi-Strauss 1962) is informal and for a large 
part not monetised in markets. The first option is modern and 
‘realistic’. The second option may seem traditional, anachronistic 
and irrelevant. However, if land is reorganised from within existing 
rural communities and infrastructure is improved so that livelihoods 
gradually improve for millions of rural people that would itself be 
a major improvement, beneficial perhaps for urban and ‘modern’ 
developments as well.3 
My concern here is to investigate how land politics and governance 
structures in what I call the land state in South Africa have affected 
the contents and slow pace of land reform. Many have noticed a 
change of government focus or government rhetoric in land reform, 
from support to ordinary livelihood-seeking people in general, to 
assistance primarily to emerging and commercial farmers (Cousins 
2003a). This change is registered in government programmes, from 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in the 
early 1990s, through the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
Programme (Gear) to the Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development (LRAD) programme. How has that more limited social 
focus of policy affected the governance system and trust relations 
within the land state? The land state is the triangular relation 
between the provincial legislatures, the provincial offices of the 
Department of Land Affairs (PDLAs) and the provincial departments 
of agriculture (PDoAs) and the relations those state institutions 
have to non-governmental stakeholders in land.4 Although western 
South Africa had no apartheid homelands, and black Africans were, 
in general, kept out of the region through influx control, the two 
provinces are different. The Northern Cape is a huge area, semi-
desert, and has few people mostly engaged in animal husbandry 
with some commercial farming (along the Orange River) and some 
major diamond mining activities. The Western Cape is urbanised, 
has an economically rich coastal area and large expanses of large-
scale commercial agriculture. The assumption is that the economic 
systems in agriculture and the basic structure of the land state are 
similar in all the provinces of South Africa. 
1.2 Trust in land reform
Adam Seligman (1997) argues that trust, both horizontally 
among people and vertically, to political and administrative state 
institutions, is necessary for a democratic society to function well. 
One reason is the degree of differentiation and interdependence of 
institutions in such a society, making it difficult for any one person 
to have specific knowledge of the trustworthiness of each institution 
that he or she has to interact with. Max Weber argued likewise 
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that an esprit de corps, a common understanding of mission and 
a realisation that that mission is important for the good functioning 
of modern public bureaucracies (Evans 1997). However, an element 
of distrust is equally important (Warren 1999; Hardin 1998). The 
democratic process is driven by differences of interest, by the 
continuous dynamic between ruling regime and opposition to it 
(Touraine 1997). If trust is based on the assumption that the trustee 
has your interest in mind, then democracy is dependent upon 
distrust. In a conflict of interests there is little reason to assume 
that the other party has your interest in mind. Rather the opposite. 
I assume here that both aspects of trust relations are important 
for sustained democracy: distrust between participating interest 
formations, be they movements, unions or political parties, and trust 
between them in the sense that the common arenas for political 
and other forms of struggle are accepted and respected. A test of 
that trust is when one interest formation is voted down in such 
an arena (for example in a national or provincial parliament), the 
interest group does not exit from the arena, it does not exit from the 
democratic system (Przeworski 1991). It was this dual level theory of 
trust relations in democratic states that informed the investigation 
of land politics and the land state in (western) South Africa that is 
briefly reported on here. 
When you do not have any specific knowledge of the institution 
you have to enter, then unconditional trust is activated towards 
the persons you interact with. However, the willingness to consider 
entering the institution is dependent upon a higher level form of 
trust, which we might call system confidence. That combination 
makes for maximum efficiency in interactions or for very low 
transaction costs. The danger is a collective seduction. Trust can be 
conditioned, and most often is. Trust can be defined as an interest. 
A company manager can see employee loyalty and trust as an 
interest, investing time and energy in acting so that employee loyalty 
and trust is enhanced. Trust can be conditioned by familiarity. 
I only trust members of my family, of a specific ethnic group, 
organisation or political party. Such trust networks can be the 
only format of cohesion in illegitimate organisations in democratic 
states (for example, mafia, criminal and terror organisations 
(Tilly, forthcoming)). Lack of vertical trust relations within an 
organisation can lead to centralisation of power and to a change 
from democratic and transparent, to authoritarian and concealed 
leadership. Unconditional trust between members of distant and 
antagonistic institutions can lead to a learning process that over 
time modifies the institutions and brings them closer to each other. 
In this sense unconditional trusters are important for system 
building in segregated societies. The question reported on here is the 
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distribution and character of trust relations within the land state 
in western South Africa, between its political and administrative 
sections, between the political parties in the land state, and between 
the land state and major stakeholders in land in the country.  
This paper asks how trust relations within the land state affect 
the power of the land state in the field of land reform. The land state 
is those public institutions engaged in the land reform programme, 
in this study, the national government, the provincial parliaments 
and the departments of land affairs and agriculture in the Northern 
and Western Cape. The investigation has been searching for (1) the 
opinions within the land state on what the land reform programme 
is about and whom it should benefit. It has attempted to (2) uncover 
the trust relations between politicians in the two main political 
parties in both provinces, and among the politicians elected into 
the provincial legislatures. The investigation has (3) registered how 
the political and administrative land elite in both provinces viewed 
the role and engagement of eleven major stakeholders in land, 
deducting the degree of trust from the pattern of opinions expressed. 
The investigation attempts (4) to deduct the competence of the land 
state in land reform from the varied descriptions the members of the 
public land elite give of the present weaknesses of the land state in 
the management of land reform and how, through which operations, 
the implementation of the land reform programme can be improved. 
We have (5) investigated how the politicians in the land state 
evaluate the loyalty, competence and efficiency of the provincial land 
administrations, in effect, the provincial offices of the Department 
of Land Affairs and the provincial departments of agriculture. Lastly 
we have looked into (6) how the land bureaucrats viewed a more 
corporate, competitive and economically independent organising of 
public services in agriculture. 
Sixty-six persons, 27 elected politicians to the two legislatures 
and 39 leading land bureaucrats in the two departments in both 
provinces answered a questionnaire on these matters.5 Those 66 are 
variously called the public land elite or the Study Group. The article 
is based on their responses, collected in 2001–2002, with some 
16 bureaucrats in the Department of Land Affairs answering the 
questionnaire in 2005.
1.3 The land elite in the two provinces
Western South Africa did not have homelands, partly because 
colonial authorities put restrictions on the immigration of black 
Africans to the area. Manual labourers were mainly coloured. The 
two provinces are, however, different. The Western Cape is rich, with 
a large urban population, modern agriculture and a large number of 
farm workers. The Northern Cape is poor, has few people scattered 
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over a vast area, with separate poor rural communities, many 
descendents of the KhoiSan people, and with modern agriculture 
(confined to the banks of the Orange River) and diamond mining. 
The Western Cape since 1994 has been ruled by the New National 
Party (NNP), by the Democratic Alliance (DA) and recently (2003) 
by an NNP/ANC coalition. In 2001, the seats in the provincial 
legislature were distributed as follows: ANC 18, NNP 18, Democratic 
Party (later the DA) 6, African Christian Democratic Party 1 and 
United Democratic Movement 1, making a total of 44. 
The Northern Cape has since 1994 been securely in the hands of 
the ANC, but a substantial part of the white and coloured population 
have supported the DA. In 2001 the Northern Cape legislature had 
30 members, 20 ANC, 8 NNP, 1 from the Freedom Front and 1 from 
the Democratic Party. 
The questionnaire, distributed in December 2001 and in August 
2005, was addressed to all the members of the two legislatures and 
all decision-making bureaucrats in or connected to land reform 
in the PDoAs and the PDLAs in the two provinces. The group of 
‘active land reformers’ in the two provincial legislatures and the 
two departments of agriculture can loosely be pegged at some 100 
persons, of whom 66 replied. 
After discussions with the administrators who distributed and 
collected the questionnaires, the members of the research team 
have reason to believe that the 66 are those engaged and informed 
on land reform politics and administration. In the Northern Cape 
35 answered the questionnaire, while in the Western Cape the 
figure was 31. Ten of the respondents in the Northern Cape were 
politicians, compared with 17 in the Western Cape (Table 1). 
The relatively small number of public servants in the Western 
Cape elite is due to the fact that only three regional directors in the 
provincial DLA answered the questionnaire. How representative 
are the politicians in the Study Group of the distribution of party 
members in the legislatures? We compared the number of ANC 
members relative to the total of ANC and DA members. The ANC had 
69% of that total in the Northern Cape legislature and 67% of that 
total (6 of 9) in the Study Group. In the Western Cape legislature, 
the ANC had 43% of the ANC/DA total (or 18 of 42 members of 
Table 1: The provincial land elites
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parliament). The ANC had 40% of the total in the Study Group, 
or 6 of 15. The Study Group had was close to being perfectly 
representative of the main parties in the two legislatures.
Gender representation was satisfactory. In the Northern Cape 
legislature, 30% were females. In the Study Group, 25% were 
females. In the Western Cape legislature, 20% were females, while 
females made up 24% of the 17-member Study Group.
Education among the 66 was systematically skewed between the 
institutions. Put briefly, the level of education increased as we moved 
from Kimberley in the Northern Cape to Cape Town in the Western 
Cape, and as we moved from legislatures to land bureaucracies. 
The Northern Cape legislature had fewer members with university 
education than did the Western Cape legislature. All the PDoA 
members of the Study Group had a university education. Nearly 
50% of the Study Group had been teachers before they entered the 
legislatures. In the Northern Cape group of politicians, not one had a 
business or management background. There were several with such a 
background among the Western Cape politicians.
2. Findings
2.1 Commercial farming is the only way; the state is a retarder, not a facilitator 
of land reform
With the dominance of the DA in Western Cape and the ANC 
in Northern Cape, it was not surprising that the Western Cape 
politicians were more critical of the ANC national government’s land 
reform programme than politicians in the Northern Cape. 
From the questions to the land bureaucrats where they could 
spell out answers, the following picture of their understanding of 
land reform emerged. The bureaucrats in both provinces thought the 
change from RDP to Gear was mainly rhetorical. The government’s 
definition of land reform as a programme for developing black 
emerging farmers on commercial farms had been in place since 
1990. The idea of giving bricoleurs on commonage more secure 
tenure and investing in infrastructure for economic development 
within their communities had never been a part of the programme 
(cf. Pycroft 1996). 
Both politicians and bureaucrats agreed that the main bottleneck 
in the land reform programme was government – the public 
sector. There was no shared, common vision within and between 
government institutions on the character of the land reform 
programme. The decision-making system was fragmented and too 
complex. In other words, the esprit de corps was not in place. The 
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state was perceived as a large ‘black box’ of disconnected elements 
through which all demands for land and relevant infrastructure had 
to pass. The outcome was seldom in line with local demands. The 
decision process hampered implementation. It slowed the community 
processes of change and distorted the consistency between incoming 
demands and outputs/decisions from government institutions. 
Corruption sapped the flow of resources from the state to the 
communities and to land reform projects. 
Only one respondent in the Western Cape said that the private 
sector was the main barrier to successful land reform. In the 
Northern Cape opinions were not very different. Two of the 12 
respondents from the PDoAs said ‘the commercial farmers are not 
involved’. The rest said that it was the public sector, the state that 
was the weak link in land reform (DLA, the Land Bank and the 
Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights were mentioned). 
In the Northern Cape office of the DLA, 13 responded. Four saw 
the private sector as the barrier to land reform (Agri-SA, organised 
agriculture and NGOs were mentioned). Seven saw government as 
the barrier (district authorities, municipalities and post-settlement 
government support were mentioned).
From these descriptions we can detect substantial distrust 
between the institutions of the land state. It is however, interesting 
that these criticisms are emerging from the public land elite. 
This indicates personal independence and a will to tell the truth, 
both important aspects of a functioning democracy. The focus of 
land reform on black commercial farming is ironic. The history of 
European colonialism in South Africa was forceful establishment of 
white-controlled commercial farming. State ownership and private 
ownership (tickets of occupation) were also mechanisms used in 
commonage areas to pry land loose from traditional authority. 
Rural bricoleur subsistence communities were suppressed and 
‘modernised’ under apartheid. They are not identified as being 
worthy of support under the present land reform regime. Conditional 
trust pulls or retracts ‘mediators’ into the conditioning institution 
and alienates people ‘on the other side of the divide’. The likelihood 
of increasing distrust in the government land reform programme 
among people living under communal tenure, outside the formal 
capital-producing economy, is high. The commercialisation policy will 
therefore engender opposition in rural communities, except among 
the few that can become commercial farmers. Major increases in 
industrial and service employment can reduce opposition. However, 
with the formal economy in South Africa for the time being creating 
fewer jobs than the number of people entering the labour market 
(2002 statistics), opposition to the commercialisation policy is likely 
to increase, even if the ideals of life and work in the urban capitalist 
economy attract many. 
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2.2  The ANC and the DA distrust each other, more so in the Northern than in 
the Western Cape
Table 2 illustrates how the politicians in the two main political 
parties, the ANC and the DA, view each other’s engagement in land 
reform. The question was: ‘If you are a member of one of the main 
parties (ANC or DA): How would you describe the role of the other 
main political party (either ANC or DA) in land reform?’
Criticism and distrust of political opponents is normal in 
a democracy. Seeing the other party as passive in a policy area is 
normal in party-political struggle. In the group of politicians as 
a whole (23 persons), it is not surprising that 30% of them see the 
other party as passive. However, that 39% of the politicians speak 
of the other party as ‘destructive of land reform’ is not normal. Such 
terminology creates a seemingly large and unbridgeable gap between 
the parties. Mediation and compromise between parties that see each 
other as destructive agents is not likely. The data speak to a larger 
divide between the parties in the Northern Cape than in the Western 
Cape. In the Northern Cape, 7 of 8 politicians see the other party 
as passive and/or destructive. In the Western Cape, 9 of 15 see the 
other party as passive or destructive. 
When asked about the other main party in provincial politics, 
the distrust between the parties increased. In the Northern Cape 
the percentage who replied ‘destructive’ rose from 38 to 63. In 
the Western Cape it rose from 40% to 79%. This shows that the 
animosity between the main political parties is substantial. Such 
animosity discourages interaction. ANC members in the Northern 
Cape legislature expressed disdain for the DA opposition. Some 
ANC members suggested the provincial level of government should 
be eliminated, exactly because it was a breeding ground for DA 
opposition to the ANC.  
Animosity makes decision-making difficult. Animosity between 
parties reduces the respect for those decisions that are made in the 
legislatures. The land bureaucracy can assume that no one really 
Table 2: The views of ANC and DA politicians of the other main party’s role in land reform* 
Northern Cape Western Cape Total
No. % No. % No. %
Constructive 1 13 6 40 7 30
Passive 4 50 3 20 7 30
Destructive 3 38 6 40 9 39
8 101 15 100 23 99
* n=23
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supports the decisions made. When decisions in legislatures lack 
legitimacy, it is easier for the land bureaucracy to act on its own 
(Gran 2005). 
2.3  Stakeholders in land reform are passive, even destructive
How did the public land elite see the participation of stakeholders 
in land in the land reform process? How supportive of land reform 
were industry, financial institutions and NGOs, and class-specific 
stakeholders like farmers, bricoleurs and farm workers? The 
distribution of viewpoints in the land elite as a whole and within each 
province is presented in Table 3. The ranking of the stakeholder, 
in the whole land elite and in the elite within each province, is 
presented in the first column of Table 3. 
Table 3 records the number of votes given to each stakeholder as 
supportive of land reform. In Column IV it registers the total number 
of votes in the whole land elite (the Study Group), in Column V votes 
in the Northern Cape land elite and in Column VI votes in the 
Western Cape land elite. In Column I the ranking of stakeholders in 
Table 3. Evaluation of stakeholders in land reform. Percentage of the land elite who see the 
stakeholder as supportive of land reform*
I II III IV V VI
Ranking












No. % No. % No %
 1 1 6 8 (3) NGOs 40 61 22 63 18 60
 6 9 1 16 (6)
Commercial farmers’ 
organisations 30 46 10 29 20 67
 5 8 1 14 (5) Commercial farmers 31 47 11 31  20 67
 3 3 1 7 (2) Subsistence producers 38 58 18 51  20 67
 4 6 1 11 (4) Farm workers 36 55 16 46  20 67
 1 2 1 4 (1)
Farm workers’ 
organisations 40 61 20  57 20 67 
 6 5 7 18 (7) Labour unions 30 46 17 49 13 43
 9 7 10 26 (9) International donors 20 30 14 40  6 20
 8 3 9 20 (8) Financial institutions 27 41  18 51  9 30
 10 10 8 28 (10) Industry 17 26  7 20  10 33
111111 33 (11)
Industrial employers’ 
organisations 11 17  6 17  5 17
* Question: Please evaluate the role of the following stakeholders relative to the administration of 
the land reform process in your province (supportive, passive or destructive).
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each of the three voting groups (the whole group, the group in the 
Northern Cape and the group in the Western Cape) is registered, 
with the most votes ranked highest. Then in Column II the ranks in 
Column I are summed. That gives a more precise ranking because 
the variations in the provincial voting are taken into the index. The 
numbers in the parentheses in Column II express the most precise 
ranking of the stakeholders that our data can produce. This most 
precise ranking ordered from 1 – most supportive of land reform, 
down to the least supportive stakeholder, is presented in Table 4.
  The state elite’s ranking of stakeholders can be interpreted as a 
factual description. The driving force in land reform is an alliance of 
African workers, subsistence producers and NGOs. The commercial 
farmers together with labour unions are a middle group, while 
the representatives of the urban economy, financial institutions, 
industry and industrial employer organisations and international 
donors are the least supportive. The ranking can have a normative 
aspect as well – how the land elite would like to see the process. We 
can interpret the ranking as radical. It is not the urban capitalistic 
society that is the driving force in land reform. It might well have 
been, in the sense that commercialisation of the economies of the 
rural areas might benefit the urban economy (higher demand for 
industrial products, better educated labour and so on). It is not the 
commercial farmers that are the main force either. It is the working 
classes assisted by NGOs that the state elite would like to see as the 
main force driving land reform. 
Returning to Table 3 on supportive stakeholders, there are 
differences of opinion between the state elites in the two provinces. 
Table 4: The public land elite’s ranking of stakeholders in land reform, ranked according to 
how many in the elite see the stakeholder as supportive of land reform
Rank Stakeholder










11 Industrial employers’ organisations
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While the Western Cape elite (Column VI) would like to see all the 
rural stakeholders as most supportive, the Northern Cape elite 
(Column V) ranks the urban stakeholders on top: NGOs, financial 
institutions, and labour unions. Among rural stakeholders farm 
workers’ organisations and subsistence producers are considered 
supportive by many members of the Northern Cape elite (57% and 
51% respectively). 
We suggest that the provincial land reform regimes are different. In 
the Western Cape, the public land elite is allied to the rural farming 
sector, including the weakest party, the subsistence producers. 
The urban industrial and financial sectors are unsupportive. The 
Northern Cape land reform regime is more connected to the urban 
sector, NGOs, farm workers’ organisations and financial institutions, 
in addition to the weakest rural element, the subsistence producers.  
These findings can support the hypothesis that mediation between 
institutions creates trust. Because of the strength of the DA/NNP 
and its historical connection to the white farming community in the 
Western Cape, there is more mediation and communication between 
commercial agriculture and provincial government there than in 
the ANC-dominated Northern Cape. In the Northern Cape, with an 
ANC majority in the legislature and an ANC Executive Council, the 
mediation between government and labour unions is more developed. 
The same is probably the case with government-donor relations 
– more co-operation in the poorer Northern Cape, and therefore 
somewhat more trust. The disturbing finding is the overall negative 
evaluation of industry in land reform, given its status as a motor in 
the development of the capital-producing South African economy. It 
can indicate that a divide between agriculture and industry, between 
commercial and communal agriculture, and/or the perception of 
industry and finance as ‘English’ and agriculture as ‘Afrikaans’ is 
still in place. In land reform, government and agriculture co-operate, 
with industry as a non-participant or even a destructive participant.  
2.4  The land elite's competence in land reform: multidimensional support to 
emerging farmers
The politicians in the two provinces under discussion, the political 
land elite, were asked where the focus in land reform should 
be. Their answers indicate a mild impatience with the national 
government and their own political parties, again an indication that 
politicians speak out; that democracy is in place; that they have a 
degree of unconditional trust in the political system they are part of. 
They can speak their mind without fear of sanction. 
The views of the public land elite as a whole
We asked all members of the land elite, both politicians and 
bureaucrats, to specify how the land reform process could be 
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improved. We asked them to select seven priorities from a list of 14 
possibilities, and to rank these in order of preference. Table 5 records 
how many members of the Study Group chose a specific policy focus 
as first, second and third policy priority for the improvement of land 
reform. Sixty Study Group members answered the question. The 
distribution of the 60 votes is given in Columns I–III. The choice 
of priorities is summed in Columns IV and V. The percentages are 
ranked from highest to lowest in Column VI.
The most recent (2002) ANC government land reform policy, LRAD, 
put focus on commercial farming and black emerging farmers. The 
politicians and bureaucrats in the two provinces supported that 
focus. In Table 5, first column, 25 of 60 possible votes were given 
to ‘commercialisation’ and ‘emerging farmers’. The respondents’ 
choice of what should be the first priority suggest that the provincial 
public land elite are in agreement with the national government on 
commercialisation and emerging farmers in land reform. However, 
the elite as a whole has a broad, multidimensional understanding 
Table 5: Suggested foci for land reform: First, second and third priorities*
I IV V VI
Priorities










1. Communally-owned land 3 5 3 11 6 7
2. Emerging farmers 21 7 8 36 20 1
3. Commercialisation 4 6 5 15 8 4
4. Farm workers 14 5 19 11 3
5. Rural development 10 3 10 23 13 2
6. Environmental protection 6 4 12 7 6
7. Local participation in politics 2 1 3 2 9
8. District level of government  5 3 7 15 8 4
9. Political parties 
10. Provincial level of government 5 19 11 3
11. Public administration 4 3 1 8 4 8
12. The democratic process 1 2 3 2 9
13. Civil society associations 1 2 1 10
14. Education and research 5 7 14 8 5
Sum 60 60 60 180 101
* Question: Assume the national government wants your personal counsel on policy/focus 
priorities for improving the land reform process. You are asked to choose 7 (seven) policy/focus 
of the following list of 14. Which 7 (seven) would you choose? Give the numbers of the items – in 
their priority from left to right.
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of land reform. The elite are conscious/ knowledgeable of many 
important aspects of successful land reform. 
This is underscored if we include the data in Column 2 for 
respondents’ second priorities. The vote for emerging farmers is 
reduced to 7 and the vote for farm workers increases from 0 to 14. 
Environmental protection moves from 2 to 6 votes. Production on 
communally-held land gets 5 votes. Participation was mentioned by 
two respondents. 
In Column III, the votes for what should be the third priority 
are spread out evenly. The highest number is 10 votes for ‘rural 
development’.6 No respondent chose ‘political parties’ as a focus. 
This is perhaps disturbing, given the high level of perceived distrust 
between them.
The combination of the data reflecting distrust across the 
industry-agriculture divide and the scant interest in communal 
subsistence production indicates that important conditions for 
the implementation of a ‘sophisticated’ policy of land reform, 
with special focus on the large numbers of poor people in the 
rural areas on communally held land, are not in place. The data 
in Table 3 and 4 indicate that co-operation and trust between 
the public land institutions and the political parties and their 
leaders are at a low level. Even if the land elite has a sophisticated 
understanding of how to implement land reform, the institutional 
integration and co-operation needed to actually implement land 
reform is not in place. This could indicate that the number of people 
willing to mediate between the institutions, that is to leave the field 
of conditioned trust and enter unconditionally into co-operation in 
the open spaces between the institutions, is low. 
The four foci that got below 2% of the 180 votes were ‘local 
participation’, ‘the democratic process’, ‘civil society associations’ 
and ‘political parties’. We interpret this as a technocratic bent in the 
thinking about land reform in the political-bureaucratic land elite. 
Did politicians and bureaucrats define land reform differently?
Did the politicians see land reform in welfare terms and did the 
land bureaucrats see it in terms of commercial production? In other 
words, were the politicians ‘softer’ and the bureaucrats ‘harder’ in 
their mental models of reality? Were bureaucrats more oriented 
towards commercialisation and the politicians more toward ‘softer’ 
values like production on communal land, favouring farm workers, 
environmental protection and education and research? Separating 
politicians from bureaucrats and separating soft from hard priorities, 
we investigated the question. Thirty-five of the 66 members of the 
Study Group responded to the question about selected soft and hard 
foci and the results are presented in Table 6. The expected numbers 
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Table 6: Politicians and bureaucrats on hard and soft values (priorities)*
Politicians Bureaucrats Total
Soft priorities 1 (3) 9 10
Hard priorities 10 15 (17) 25
Total 11 24 35
* Chi square is 2.983 and Gamma is -0.714. Statistical significance 0.08.
Table 7: Politicians’ evaluations of the Department of Land Affairs in each province*
Northern Cape Western Cape Total
Strong 4 (3) 3 7
Weak 5 13 (12) 18
Total 9 16 25
* Chi: 2.6, statistical significance 0.17.
in the table that assume no statistical dependency are between 
brackets.7
These data negate the hypothesis of soft politicians and hard land 
bureaucrats. The focus on commercialisation was stronger, more 
present among the politicians than among the land bureaucrats. 
2.5 Politicians doubt the effectiveness and loyalty of the land bureaucracy
How did the politicians in the provincial legislatures evaluate the 
agricultural and land bureaucracies? The Department of Land Affairs 
has responsibility for land reform, redistribution, restitution and 
securing tenure. How did the politicians evaluate the strength of the 
provincial DLA offices in land reform? Table 7 presents the data, 
expected cell values in parantheses.
As the Chi and significance measures indicate, the statistical 
relation is not very strong. However, the tendency is demonstrated 
in the ‘total’ column. Seven politicians said the provincial DLA is 
strong, 18 said it was weak. Separating the provinces, the tendency 
in the Northern Cape is that the politicians support the DLA, in 
the Western Cape that they are critical or sceptical. However, if 
we consider the possibility that the selection of the 25 politicians 
was a random selection, the number critical in the Western Cape 
is only slightly higher than would be expected, given the marginal 
distributions.
The provincial department of agriculture is the operative support 
agent in the land reform process. How was it evaluated by the 
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Table 8: Politicians’ evaluations of the department of agriculture in each province*
Northern Cape Western Cape Total
Strong 4  (2) 2 6
Weak 6 14   (12) 20
Totals 10 16 26
* Chi: 2.6, statistical significance 0.11.
Table 9: Co-operation between the PDLA and PDoA. Should it be improved?
Politicians Bureaucrats Total %
Yes, very much 13 21 34 54
Yes, somewhat 11 12 23 37
Their co-operation is okay 1 5 6 9
Totals 25 38 63 100
politicians? Of 26 politician respondents, six felt it was a strong 
department at the provincial level and 20 felt it was weak. Table 8 
describes the evaluations of the politicians in each province, expected 
cell values in parenthesis.
Table 8 indicates that the Northern Cape politicians were more 
favourable to the PDoA than should be expected if there was no 
statistical relation. In the Western Cape the politicians were more 
critical than expected if there was no statistical relation. The 
significance of the result is low (above 10% chance of the result). 
Therefore the tendency in Table 8 is weak. It indicates that it is in 
the Western Cape that the politicians are critical of the PDoA. 
We asked all 66 respondents, politicians and land bureaucrats, 
about co-operation between the two bureaucracies, the PDLA and the 
PDoA. The results are presented in Table 9.
In Table 9 expected and actual numbers overlap. Therefore we 
can concentrate on the ‘Total’ column. Only six of the total public 
land elite (63 persons in this case) saw the level of co-operation 
as acceptable – less than 10%. An absolute majority (34 or 54% 
of the 63) found that major improvements were needed in the co-
operation between departments. The land bureaucrats were as 
critical of the relation between the two department offices as were 
the politicians. This speaks to a large distance and lack of co-
operation between the political and the administrative institutions in 
the land state. The political leadership does not experience the land 
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bureaucracy as being attuned to its political leadership. However, it 
also speaks to a realistic and openly critical bureaucratic elite.
Were there variations between the provinces? Did the political-
administrative elites in the land state in the two provinces differ on 
their view of the PDLA-PDoA co-operation? The data are in Table 10.
Table 10: PDoA-DLA relations, as evaluated by provincial elites (expected values in 
parentheses)*
Northern Cape elite Western Cape elite Total
In need of much improvement 22  (18) 12  (16) 34
In need of some improvement 10  (12) 13  (11) 12
The co-operation is okay 1   (3)   5  (3)  6
Total 33  30 63
* Chi square 5.87 statistical significance 0.05.
The difference in the evaluations across provinces is statistically 
significant. The Northern Cape elite is markedly more critical of 
the relation than the land elite in the Western Cape. The difference 
may have been reduced somewhat if the DLA office in the Western 
Cape had supplied information from more of its officers, not only its 
three directors. The difference may also be explained by the fact that 
the data from the Northern Cape PDoA are more from bureaucrats 
working in the regions of the province, while the data from the 
Western Cape PDoA are more from people working in the central 
administration at Elsenburg. 
However, the data support the impression that the Western Cape 
land elite is more representative of a middle class management 
experience than is its Northern Cape counterpart. There are younger 
people in the Northern Cape land elite (22 of 34 respondents were 
under the age of 40, compared to 8 of the 31 in the Western Cape 
elite). The Western Cape elite has more people with experience 
from middle level management of business and other types of 
organisations.
The data indicate a large distance between the PDLA offices and 
the agricultural departments, with few trusted mediators. This 
distance exacerbates distrust on both sides. Lack of co-operation 
between the departments explains a major problem in land reform: 
people can get a small piece of land within a communal arrangement 
(from the PDLA), but infrastructure, controlled mainly by the PDoA 
and other sectors of the state, does not materialise. The result is 
disarray in the management of newly acquired land and reproduction 
of the poverty setting from the original homestead.
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2.6  Corporate organisation of public administration: the Northern Cape elite is 
more positive
We asked the land bureaucrats in both provinces about their view of 
the value, or the effect of corporate organisation of the public land 
administration – the effect of making semi-autonomous corporations 
of public institutions responsible for their incomes and expenditures 
on 11 dimensions of activity. We recorded the number of those 
activities the respondent thought would benefit from corporate 
organising and calculated what proportion this formed of the 11. The 
data are presented in Table 11. 
Table 11: Evaluation of land bureaucrats of the extent to which corporate organisation of 
public administration benefits land reform
Below 50% of the 11 
dimensions
Above 50% of the 11 
dimensions Total
Northern Cape 9 13 22
Western Cape 10 4 14
Total 19 17 36
In Table 11 we see that Northern Cape land bureaucrats were more 
positive towards corporate organising of the public administration 
than were their Western Cape counterparts. This is despite 
the fact (or perhaps because of the fact) that the Western Cape 
land bureaucrats were more familiar with the use of corporate 
forms of organising public services. Ten of 14 respondents were 
sceptical in the Western Cape, while nine of 22 were sceptical in 
the Northern Cape. Corporatisation essentially separates politics/
central administration from sector-specific service delivery. 
The latter is commercialised under public oversight. If rural 
subsistence production is politically recognised, then a corporatised 
administration under strong government leadership and funding 
may well deliver infrastructure efficiently to bricoleurs. However, 
since that condition (the recognition of subsistence production) is 
unlikely, at least in the short term, then holding on to the classical 
model of public administration – where the public bureaucracy has 
both functions, both secretariat for government and responsibility 
for services – is more likely to give rural bricoleurs some recognition. 
One reason is that a classical public bureaucracy is more likely to 
contain bureaucrats with varying ideological orientations and social 
identifications (cf. Tables 3 and 4 on the evaluation of stakeholders). 
That kind of administrative pluralism (recognition of commercial 
farmers, emerging farmers and bricoleurs) is less likely in a 
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corporatised, commercialised system of administration. Recognising 
and supporting livelihood activities outside the capital-market circuit 
is less likely there.
3. Conclusion: Distrust within the land state hampers 
land reform
In a nutshell, the findings of this investigation are that distrust within the land state and the skewed urban-international attention of government hampers land reform. Democracy was in place in the land state. The ruling regime-opposition 
relation was active, even if there was a high level of distrust between 
the main political parties. Both politicians and land bureaucrats 
were outspoken. Politicians were willing to openly criticise their 
own party. Land bureaucrats could criticise the department they 
worked in. These are signs of a functioning democracy. The land 
state had competence in land reform. It supported the government’s 
emerging farmer focus. At the same time it represented a complex, 
multidimensional understanding of how to develop agriculture in 
the rural areas. The space for supporting emerging farmers in the 
PDoAs was not large, but it was present. However, the idea that 
the land state should support productive activities on communally 
held land hardly had any adherents in the PDoAs. That idea was 
somewhat more present in the PDLAs. The land state was active in 
transferring land to emerging farmers. The government’s ambition 
of developing infrastructure necessary for productive activities on 
transferred land was formulated, but hardly implemented. The 
provincial land state was radically more competent on the complexity 
of existing social relations and instruments needed for viable rural 
development than was expressed in the land reform programmes of 
the national government. The provincial land state did not emerge 
as the main reason for the relatively slow pace of land reform. The 
government’s rather dogmatic focus on commercialisation and the 
lack of resources and organisational development of local government 
appeared to be a more important explanation of the slow pace of 
reform.     
The level of co-operation between the main units of the land 
state, between the legislatures, the PDLAs and the PDoAs was weak. 
Distrust of relations both within these units and between them 
was widespread. There had been very few attempts at working with 
colleagues across institutional boundaries. Unconditional trust 
was, in this sense, limited. The idea of trust as interest was also 
limited. That emerged from the data on mental models of reality. 
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The idea that improved land reform required more popular and civil 
society participation in policy making and implementation was not 
supported by the public land elite in the two provinces. The land elite 
had a technocratic bent. That orientation indicates that members 
of the land elite do not consider their trustworthiness in the eyes of 
common people to be important for successful land reform. In this 
sense, the land elite did not consider trust as an interest. It is most 
likely that the land elite just did not think in those terms. This lack 
of attention to popular trust inside state institutions may have deep 
roots in South African history. 
The status of trust as familiarity is difficult to evaluate from the 
data in this investigation. The lack of co-operation between political 
parties, state institutions and stakeholders can indicate that trust as 
familiarity is strong. You trust members of your own institution, your 
own ‘family’ with little trust between them. However, strong trust 
within institutions of the land state did not emerge from the data. 
The data indicated that, within each of the institutions, there were 
people sincerely engaged in trying to breach the isolation, specifically 
trying to improve the institution’s engagement in land reform and 
to develop co-operation in that regard. Among members of the main 
parties, ANC and DA, trust as familiarity was strong; somewhat 
stronger among ANC members than among DA members. Perhaps 
this is a general phenomenon. We might call it a post-revolutionary 
trauma. The new power holders, representing an earlier oppressed 
majority against a minority now in opposition which represents most 
of the power in the economy, will easily move towards trusting only 
party members when facing critical opposition pressure. Specifically, 
the trauma leads to centralisation of power in the new state and 
Africanism in the ANC. It can lead to a concentration of government 
power in the economy, and attempts by the opposition to co-opt 
ruling party members into economic leadership. 
Trust theory suggests that it is the institutionalisation of the 
existing distrust and enmity that is crucial for democracy and for 
co-operation between people in subsistence-oriented and capital-
producing economic activity. The present isolation of the different 
units of the land state, the technocratic bent in that state and 
the slow development of land reform does not bode well for the 
strengthening of democracy and urban-rural co-operation. 
It is an irony that only a few years after gaining power in 1994, the 
ANC abandoned the idea of a strong social democratic state engaged 
in powerful redistribution of resources and land in South Africa. 
Instead, it subscribed to the comparative advantage and free trade 
idea of mainstream Western economics. This model of reality can 
explain structures in the data of this investigation. It leads to scant 
government attention to home markets and a lack of willingness 
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to protect local entrepreneurs in those markets. It leads to a lack 
of comprehension of the values of subsistence-oriented production 
on communally-held land. The stance of the provincial land state 
on rural poverty was different, almost the opposite of the view of 
the national government. The land state identified with the rural 
community, saw the commercial farmers and their organisations as 
only partly supportive of land reform, and identified urban industry 
as the least supportive of land reform (some even used the term ‘the 
enemy’). Given the demonstrated competence of the provincial land 
state, we can suggest the following explanation of the slow pace of 
land reform.  
The combination of the comparative advantage perspective and 
the idea of a weak state subordinated to the functioning of global 
markets has led to a lack of attention to land reform. The rather 
sophisticated knowledge of methods for rural development in the 
land state is for that reason devalued, if not denigrated. This view 
outlook and devaluation limits the allocation of resources to land 
reform. It generates frustrations and relations of distrust in the land 
state. The welfare orientation of land reform programme up to LRAD 
in 2000 and the lack of resources to development of local government 
have the same explanation. The welfare element of the programme 
has recently (2000–2005) improved rural living conditions, not 
through job creation, but through increased welfare grants.
This combination of pro-globalisation and the welfare conception 
of land reform can explain the different land regimes in the Western 
and Northern Cape provinces. The Western Cape has a strong 
class of commercial farmers and a strong land bureaucracy. They 
are integrated and co-operate well. The land reform demands are 
relatively limited, making the land elite less dependent upon financial 
institutions and NGOs for implementing land reform. The opposite is 
the case in the Northern Cape; a small class of commercial farmers 
and government are highly dependent upon financial institutions 
and NGOs for implementation of land reform. The ANC regime 
there supported the government programme. The DA regime in the 
Western Cape was allied with the rural community.
Bricoleurs – people under multiple-use value-oriented livelihood 
regimes – seeking subsistence, with limited connections to the formal 
economy, are hardly seen in government circles and not recognised 
in national land reform policy. The Department of Land Affairs has 
the potential freedom to identify bricoleurs on communally-held 
land as an important group in government land reform policy. As a 
national department with provincial offices independent of provincial 
governments, it has the potential to develop methods for economic 
and social development on communally-held land.
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The PDoAs are large operational administrations within provincial 
government. They have been engaged in support for large-scale 
commercial agriculture over a long time. To reorient their activities 
toward bricoleurs is, at best, a long-term project, at worst not 
possible. The technical, biological and economic knowledge 
(the knowledge regime) in the Western Cape PDoA is set within a 
paradigm of state managed large-scale commercial agriculture (Gran 
1997). That regime will be refined and developed with the focus on 
commercial farming. 
However, the PDoAs allowed space for RDP offices in the 1990s 
and for rural development projects on communally-held land and 
extension services to small-scale emerging farmers. If that space 
is expanded with training facilities, expansion of local agricultural 
schools and private sector engagement, the departments may 
facilitate a fruitful, soft, interaction between rural communities on 
commonages, markets and capital-producing agriculture. 
Some conditions for the development of unconditional trust in the 
spaces between institutions of land reform and between state and 
society in South Africa can be discerned in the study. It was when 
the ANC was insecure about the electorate in the early 1990s that 
it most clearly spoke of common and poor peoples’ interests in land 
and propagated a strong regulatory government to respond to those 
interests. At that time, the development of a new democracy was 
important. It was in a province ruled by the opposition to the ANC 
– the Western Cape – that the largest number of politicians viewed 
the other main party as being supportive of land reform. It was in the 
province with developed agriculture and a high level of agricultural 
education (the Western Cape) that the commercial farmers were 
more positive about redistribution of land and the politicians saw 
commercial farmers as being supportive of land reform. 
Trust based in expectations of government delivery to poor people 
was high in 1994. It has since gone down. As unconditional trust 
is reduced to ‘calculated interest’ (within existing administrations) 
and to familiarity (in the ANC), the power of provincial legislatures 
has been reduced and the power of markets and bureaucracies 
have increased. Trust among rural people that a boom in the 
urban economy will benefit them, is reduced as the ANC directs 
its attention to the urban and the international economy. The RDP 
rhetoric on rural development has not been fulfilled by practical 
measures and real land reform. The devaluation of production 
on commonages, the devaluation of traditional authority and the 
devaluation of the professional knowledge on rural development in 
the provincial land state reduces rural trust in government. The ANC 
policy regenerates rural peoples’ faith in traditional leadership and 
paternal authority in extended families, ‘tribes’ and regional ethnic 
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groups. Unemployment and landlessness increase the feeling of risk, 
even a feeling of danger of not being able to survive, and forces many 
to withdraw from the democratic process.
The lack of trust recorded in this study is related to the focus on 
commercialisation (markets as imperatives) and emerging farmers, 
excluding bricoleurs. Trust as interest directed towards bricoleurs 
is limited. Local government receives little support for productive 
activities and substantial support for welfare grants. 
This strategy of overlooking rural subsistence communities and 
hoping that commercialisation and support to emerging farmers 
will lead to economic and social improvement in the rural areas 
may be unrealistic and may be a harbinger of more open conflict. 
Drawing the millions of rural poor people in South Africa into the 
democratic process seems to be dependent on an appropriate and 
diversified infrastructure for multiple livelihood communities being 
put in place.8 It seems important to connect such communities softly, 
carefully, into the capital-producing market economy. 
In the Northern Cape, strong government was in place, but the 
ANC’s distrust of opposition was hampering the democratic process. 
In the Western Cape the land government was being corporatised, 
most likely reducing the administrative capacity to absorb 
demands from the rural subsistence communities and to intervene 
constructively in these communities. However, because the ruler-
opposition relation was more active in the Western Cape in 2001, the 
democratisation of the political process and the possibility of a rural 
voice in politics were (relatively) more advanced in the Western Cape.
Endnotes
1    A preliminary analysis of trust relations in land reform is 
presented in Chapter 7 of Askvik & Bak 2005. The viewpoints on 
land reform expressed here are further elaborated and analysed 
in the context of state building and trust in South Africa over 
time in a book manuscript with the working title Land politics, 
trust relations and democracy in South Africa.
2    I use ‘modern’ as a short form for Western-type industrialised 
societies with markets as ‘imperatives’ (Wood 1999), as distinct 
from rural tradition-bound societies. As the term ‘modern’ has 
that denotation and at the same time a connotation of ‘a society 
that is organisationally most timely, more up-to-date’, it should 
be scrapped. ‘Modern’ is often contrasted to ‘pre-modern’, as if 
pre-modern societies are ‘naturally on their way’ to the modern, 
and that the modern is the only ‘real’ alternative’ – again an idea 
with strong ideological and ethnocentric bias.
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3    Steven Robins (no date) argues that the distinction of modern 
and subsistence, tradition-bound is hardly relevant any more 
in the analysis of social formations in South Africa, and that 
the academic interest in trust and social capital is a scapegoat 
for the neo-liberal, neo-conservative project of withdrawing 
the state from its social responsibilities. Trust is an alternative 
mechanism for keeping people in place, despite a withdrawal of 
public services to middle and lower classes. My position is that 
the distinction between production within the relation of capital 
(the capital owner-wage worker relation) and production in other 
social relations (husband-wife in family, student-teacher in public 
schools, village chief-family and so on) is valid and important in 
the development debate. Development is often seen as expansion 
within the capital relation of production and the absorption 
of use-value-oriented production into the capital relation. The 
present interest in privatisation of public activities is an example. 
4    This investigation is located in a broad field of work on rural 
development and land reform in southern Africa (Lipton et al. 
1996; Bruce 1993; Moyo 1995; Bernstein 1996), on management 
of natural resources (Cousins 2000; Shackleton & Campbell et al. 
2001) and political developments (Shivji 1998; Mamdani 1996; 
Rueschemeyer et al. 1992 and Tilly 1985).
5    Two questionnaires were distributed, one to politicians in the 
provincial legislatures and one to land administrators in the 
provincial departments of agriculture and the provincial offices of 
the Department of Land Affairs. 
6    I interpret ‘rural development’ as assistance for building 
infrastructure for commercial farming in rural areas, with a weak 
focus on rural multiple livelihoods and the cultural-economy 
of subsistence. This interpretation is corroborated by the low 
level of interest in subsistence-oriented production and common 
ownership of land.
7    The more difference between real and expected numbers, the 
more important the differences in the core of the table. The 
more similar these numbers are, the more we can focus on 
the differences in the marginal numbers in the table on the 
dependent variable – the priorities in Table 4.
8    Ben Cousins (2003b) makes this point: Current agricultural 
development programmes tend to favour ‘emergent’ black farmers 
who see themselves functioning in large-scale commercial farming 
terms. Through the National African Farmers’ Union (NAFU), they 
have argued that they should receive the same kind of extensive 
government support that white farmers used to receive from the 
apartheid state and its predecessors.
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